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THE UNDETERMINED SCOPE OF A LENDER'S
LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS DEBTOR
The savings and loan association and the small undercapitalized
builder are two compatible, if not mutually reliant, parties. The association must pay a higher rate of interest in order to successfully
compete with banks for deposits. These higher rates must be offset
by charging a higher interest rate on loans. The small and/or inexperienced developer, on the other hand, seldom has sufficient capital
to finance his projects. 1 The small size and high risk of the venture
work towards disinterest on the part of banks and life insurance companies. 2 Thus deprived of other means of funding, the small builder
is willing to pay the association's high interest rates. The association,
usually barred by statute from direct participation in real estate investment,3 is more than willing to make mortgage loans in this high-yield
area. Owing to the large number of small builders and this reciprocal
need they share with saving associations, the latter now supply approximately one-half of the capital for residential real estate development. 4
The harmony of this situation, however, has been disrupted to an
undetermined extent by Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan
Association,5 where a savings association was held liable for the
negligent construction by its debtor-builder.
In Connor the purchaser of a house in a low-budget development
brought suit against the vendor-builder and the defendant Association, which was the principle construction financier. The plaintiff
sought recovery for damages resulting from a major structural defect
in his house. It was found that foundations were negligently installed
for the soil type in the area and as a result the homes suffered serious
damage when soil expansion and contraction caused the foundations
to buckle and crack. It was undisputed that the builder had no experience in tract or community development; that he was extremely
'See Lefcoe 8 Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J.
1271 (1966).
2Id.
3Only thirteen states allow savings associations to purchase and develop land;
and in these states investment is limited to a small percentage of the association's total assets. Id. at 1273 & n.5. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 6705 (West 1968); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 799 (Smith-Hurd 1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.540 (382) (Cum.
Supp. 1969).
'Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271,
1283 n.37 (1966).
5- Cal. 2d -, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).

1969]

CASE COMMENTS

under capitalized; and that he was operating on a thin profit margin.6
It was further established that he had not employed an architect,
but rather had relied upon "prepackaged" plans unadaptable to local
soil conditions. It was also shown that the officers of the Association
were aware of all of these facts but had neither questioned the adequacy of the foundation plans nor had made any recommendations
as to the design or construction of the homes. No inspections were
made by the Association of the homes as they were being built, but
instead a building inspector was relied upon with whom the Association had no prior experience. Finally, it was undisputed that the
builder was negligent in the construction of the homes. The court
determined that by its actions the Association had breached a duty
to protect a buyer from at least major structural defects, and that
its negligence was not superseded by that of either the builder or the
inspector but rather, was a concurring proximate cause of the injury. 7
Public policy, the court argued, required the imposition of liability.8
The negligence of the Association thus stems from several omissions. Prior to construction Great Western failed to correlate the
blueprints with the project site; to make an inspection of soil conditions and other foundation hazards; and to examine the plans with
an eye to minimum architectual requirements and marketability.
During actual construction it failed to employ inspectors with whom
0The assets of the defendant developer, the Conejo Development Co., amounted
to $5,oo. The additional money required to finance the tract development was
about $3,oooooo and was supplied by the defendant Association. The margin of
profit to the builder was less than $5oo per house. Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co.,
- Cal. App. 2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Such a thin profit margin
usually leads to defective workmanship. In order to maintain profits in the face
of an unexpected cost, skimping becomes necessary. When this is combined with
inexperience the result is often serious. Id. at 34 o .
^To decide the question of duty, the court cited Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 32o P.2d 16 (1958), as precedent and employed a six factor test found therein.
See note 24 infra. In particular, the court found that given the genre of builder
here involved it is quite foreseeable that unless he is often inspected he may
often "cut corners" to the injury of future buyers. It also found that the buyer's
injury was closely connected with the defendant's failure to reject the prepackaged
blueprints until they had been properly modified. As to the question of the
builder's negligence being a superseding cause of the injury, the court said:
"Conejo's negligence could not be a superseding cause, for the risk that it might
occur was the primary hazard that gave rise to Great Western's duty." 447 P.2d
at 619, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 379. See Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269
('955); Fennessey v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 2o Cal. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 51 (1942).
8447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377. See also Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552,
875 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d
685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 845, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (i96i); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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it had experience and who would have constantly checked for structural
defects. Such negligent omissions could have been avoided without
undue burden had Great Western followed certain construction loan
procedures already common with savings associations of comparable
size.9
Savings associations take care in protecting the quality and marketability of the project in order to insure the safety of their loan. The
completed structure is the primary security on a construction loan to
an undercapitalized builder. Where the savings association knows
that the developer is inexperienced and is working on a thin profit
margin its failure to exert such supervision over the builder as is
reasonable under the circumstances in order to prevent imperiling
its security interest can be considered an act of negligence towards its
shareholders.' 0 In Connor the court considered these omissions as acts
of negligence towards future homebuyers as well. Unfortunately, it
is hard to deduce from the nature of the omissions whether this
liability is coterminous with that of the association to its shareholders,
or whether it rests upon a different theory or criteria, which in a
future situation may be broadened. The former would be the consequence of a MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." approach; the latter
would result from the use of a negligent entrustment theory.
In MacPherson the plaintiff was injured when a wheel collapsed
on a newly purchased automobile. It was shown that the wheel had
been negligently made by a contractor who supplied it to the defendant manufacturer. It was also shown that by reasonable inspection the defendant could have detected the defect. By so failing to
inspect, the defendant acted negligently towards its local dealer-the
defendant's immediate contract purchaser. Owing to the foreseeability
of harm to future users in the plaintiff's class, should the automobile
be defective, the court held that the omission constituted actionable
negligence against this third party plaintiff.' 2 The plaintiff's cause of

action is thus based upon the defendant's negligent act towards the
direct contract party. The third party is merely allowed to step into
the latter's shoes. The result of this approach therefore is to increase
OMost large savings and loan associations follow these procedures and often
incorporate them into their training manuals. See 35 U. Cm. L. RiEv. 739, 745 &
n.42 (1968). Great Western, with assets of $8oo million, is one of the largest savings
associations in the nation. 56 Gao. L.J. 789 n.7 (1968). For a detailed account as
-to the accepted standard operating procedures employed by savings and loan
associations, see 35 U. Giu. L. Rrv. 739, 747-48 (1968).
"0447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
11 7 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1Id. at 1053.

1o5o

(1916).
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the number of parties who can sue for the original breach of duty.
In a suit by an injured homebuyer against a savings association-the
construction loan creditor-liability must be predicated upon an omission amounting to negligence towards the association's shareholders
and which would foreseeably cause injury to the homebuyer. The
scope of liability thus imposed by the MacPherson approach is rather
narrow.
However, a negligent entrustment theory will admit of a broader
liability to third parties. Negligent entrustment is characterized by
the lending' 3 or sale 14 of an instrument by one party to another when
it is reasonably foreseeable by the first party that injury will result
to a third person due to the borrower's or vendee's reasonably known
17
inexperience' 5 or incompetence' 0 with that instrument. Should injury
"McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. 2d 546, 1o9 P.2d 358 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Hardwick v. Bublitz, 254 Iowa 1253, 119 N.W.2d 886 (1963); Priestly v. Skourup,

142 Kan. 127, 45 P.2d 852 (1935); Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 17

o

A. 532 (1934);

Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S.E. 576 (1926); Hopkins v. Droppers, 184
Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924).
24Johnson v. Casett, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).

5Carter v. Montgomery, 226 Ark. 989, 296 S.W.2d 442 (1956); Ware v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 291, 311 P.2d 316 (1957); Dinger v. Burnham,
36o Mo. 465, 228 S.W.2d 696 (1950); Wilson v. Brauer, 97 N.J.L. 482, 117 A. 699
(1922). In Wilson a parent entrusted a minor child with the family car and
allowed him to drive it through the center of town. Evidence tended to show that
the child did not have a driver's permit and, to the knowledge of the parent,
knew nothing about driving. Such facts were found sufficient to state a cause of
action in negligence against the parent as owner of the car by a party injured
by the driver's negligence. Wilson is a situation where the lender was negligent
because he knew or had reason to know that the bailee was inexperienced in the
use of the instrument, and that injury in traffic to another party was foreseeable.
"Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1967); Department of Water and
Power v. Anderson, 95 F.2d 577 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 3o5 U.S. 607 (1938); Rocca
v. Steinmetz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 P. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Rounds v. Phillips,
166 Md. 151, 17o A. 532 (1934); Anderson v. Daniel, 136 Miss. 456, 101 So. 498
(1924); Moran v. Moran, 124 Neb. 379, 246 N.W. 711 (1933); Williamson v. Eclipse
Motor Lines Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E.2d 339 (1945); Coker v. Moose, 18o Okla.
234, 68 P.2d 5o4 (1937); Gossett v. Van Egmond, 176 Ore. 134, 155 P.2d 304 (1945);
Russell Constr. Co. v. Ponder, 143 Tex. 412, 186 S.W.2d 233 (1945); Reid v. Owens,
92 Utah 432, 69 P.2d 265 (1937). In

Rounds v. Phillips, a parent gave her son

unlimited use of an automobile. It was shown that the parent-lender knew that
her son was an incorrigibly reckless driver, that he frequently drove while intoxicated, and that he had had his driver's permit revoked for numerous speeding
violations. Following the death of a third party caused by the son's negligent driving, it was held that such entrustment was a basis for a cause of action against
the owner-mother. Rounds thus presents the second type of negligent entrustment,
entrustment to a person who the lender knows or has reason to know is so incompetent (although experienced) in the use of the instrument, that misuse and
subsequent injury are foreseeable,
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occur, the liability of the vendor is not a vicarious product of the
separate act of entrustment.' s The basis of the theory is that there
has occurred a breach of a duty to use one's property so as not to
unreasonably cause harm to another. The lender's negligence is not
contingent upon the ultimate omission of the bailee, but rests solely
upon the act of entrustment which becomes unreasonable in light of
the foreseeability and serious consequences of such an omission by the
bailee. 10 It should be noted that the inability of the bailee, owing to
either inexperience or incompetence, to properly handle the instrument must be known by the owner. Most courts, however, feel that
for an entrustment to be negligent the bailee need not be manifestly
incompetent at the time of the bailment, but it is sufficient that he will
foreseeably be so in the future.20 An additional and final incident of
negligent entrustment is that the lender's negligence can be categorized
as negligence concurrent with the negligence of the bailee. It can be
said that "but for" the acts of each, the injury would not have occurred.
The negligence of each is thus both a proximate and a concurrent
cause of harm to the third party.21
The extension of funds to a party who, through both inexperience
and reckless incompetence, will foreseeably mismanage them to the
injury of a third party, can be a case of negligent entrustment. It would
be immaterial that the item entrusted, the money, unlike an automobile, was not the physical instrument of harm. Rather, it would
only be crucial that the item presents the bailee with the means or
IFSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302A, 308 (1965). But see Estes v.
Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 6o4 (Ky. 1953); Lovett Motor Co. v. Walley, 217 Miss. 384,
64 So. 2d 370 (195); Brown v. Harkleroad, 3 Tenn. App. 657, 287 S.W.2d 92 (1956).
Almost any instrument may be the subject of a negligent entrustment if it is
potentially dangerous when misused. E.g., Meers v. McDowell, 11o Ky. 926, 62 S.W.
1o13 (19o); see Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (1937).
'sBrady v. B. 8: B. Ice Co., 242 Ky. 138, 45 S.W.2d 1o5 (1932); Williamson v.
Eclipse Motor Lines Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E.2d 339 (1945).
1
' It is not required that the 'specific' injury or 'such' an injury as is complained
of was or ought to have been specifically anticipated as the natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful act. It is sufficient if the facts and circumstances are
such that the consequences attributable to the wrongful conduct charged are
within the field of reasonable anticipation; that such consequences might be the
natural and probable results thereof, though they may not have been specifically
contemplated or anticipated by the person so causing them. Morey v. Lake
Superior Terminal and Transfer Ry., 125 Wis. 148, 103 N.W. 271, 274 (19o5).
OEllsworth v. Ludwig, - Ind. -, 23o N.E.2d 612 (1967) (dissenting opinion);
Snowhite v. State, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966).
-'lennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., go Cal. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 51 (1942).
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ability heretofore lacking to effectuate the injury.22 Negligent entrustment, unlike the liability theory of MacPherson, gives a third party a
cause of action which is independent of a duty owed -to anyone else.
By using a negligent entrustment approach it would be possible for
a savings association to be liable to a homebuyer although it had
breached no duty to its shareholders. A loan upon adequate security
could still be the basis of a cause of action by a third party if the
lending party had reason to know that the debtor would negligently
use the funds to the injury of another.23 The scope of liability imposed by negligent entrustment is thus quite broad.
The court in Connor did not indicate whether it used a MacPherson or a negligent entrustment approach to impose liability upon the
defendant. Rather, it cited six considerations as determinative of
whether in any given situation a negligent defendant should be held
liable to a third party with whom he is not in privity. 24 Even an
uNote, however, that where the second party already has the capability of
harm, for example, he already owns an automobile, and the defendant merely
entrusts him with a commodity, for instance alcohol, which will cause him
to misuse his own property, there is no cause of action. See, e.g., State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951), where a bartender was held not liable to
an injured third party because he continued to serve the tortfeasor despite the
fact that he knew the party would consequently drive home in a drunken condition.
='Assume, for example, that a party seeks funds from a savings association to
open a small laundry. He owns the building which is in good repair and of a
commercial value of $i,ooo,ooo, but he needs $0,ooo

to purchase such necessary

equipment as a washing machine and a steam press. The association makes the
loan despite the fact that it knows that he has had absolutely no experience in
the cleaning business. In the first week of business he ruins several thousand
dollars worth of clothing by ineptly using improper amounts of detergent. Although
the association was in no way negligent towards its shareholders in making the
loan, it may well be liable to those whose clothes were destroyed upon the theory
of negligent entrustment. The loan placed him in a position to effect harm foreseeable from his known inexperience. On the other hand, if the MacPherson reasoning is accepted, the association would not be liable to the customers of the laundry
in that there has been no breach of a duty to its shareholders.
24
This six factor test was developed in the case of Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.
2d 647, 32o P.2d 16 (1958).
In Biakania the defendant was a notary public who, upon testator's request,
had drawn a will leaving the testator's entire estate to the plaintiff. The will was
negligently drawn and suffered from such defects that it was not admitted to
probate. Consequently, the plantiff-beneficiary received only a small intestate share
rather than his larger share under the will. The court developed a test based upon
the relevant incidents and social considerations within the case to weigh the defense
of lack-of-privity. "The determination whether in a specific case the defendant
will be held liable to a third party not in privity is a matter of policy and involves
the balancing of various factors.. " 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. Connor
has a different factual abstract from Biakanja and thus different social considerations are bound to be involved. Unlike Connor, in Biakanja the defendant owed
a duty of care to the second party (the testator) to avert the foreseeable injury to

398

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

examination of each consideration as though it were the determinative
one will not reveal the theory which the court adopted. Most of the
considerations bear similarities to the language and elements of either
theory.
The first test is to what extent was the transaction-here the financing of the project by Great Western-intended to affect the plaintiff.
The court noted that for the Association, the success of the entire loan
transaction depended upon the arrangements it had with the builder
to insure that it would finance the purchases of future homebuyers.
Thus it was concluded that the transactions were intended to affect
the plaintiff significantly. This consideration is the only one of the
six which bears an affinity to only one approach. It makes no difference
under negligent entrustment whether the lender intends the bailment
to involve third parties. Liability generally attaches to the lender
despite the fact that he probably hopes the bailee will act so as not
to affect parties in the plaintiff's class. On the other hand, the MacPherson approach depends upon the defendant's knowledge that his
relation to the contracting party will affect the plaintiff.2

5

The second test, the foreseeability of harm to the third party
plaintiff arising from the transaction, is a key element under both
theories. Under MacPherson it must be reasonably foreseeable that
the negligent act toward the contract party will in turn cause harm
to the plaintiff (the future intended user).26 In negligent entrustment
it must be reasonably foreseeable that the bailee will misuse the instrument -to the injury of a third party.2 7 The fact that the builder was
inexperienced, working on a narrow profit margin, and under the
pressure of a short-term loan made negligent construction and consequent harm to a buyer foreseeable. The court, however, did not
the plaintiff; in Biakanja the plaintiff has no cause of action against the second
party, and the injury was caused by a defective product actually made by the
defendant. Therefore, if a public policy approach is to be used in the creditordebtor situation, it would have been better to decide whether a duty was owed
based upon considerations tailored to the facts rather than with a test developed
in a non-analogous situation.
5217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at io53.
2If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger .... If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer.. is under a duty to make it carefully .... There must be
knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable .... There must also be
knowledge that in the usual course of events the danger will be shared by others
than the buyer.
217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.

"See cases cited note 14-16 supra.
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indicate whether it was utilizing these factors in establishing the Association's negligence to its shareholders or whether it was using these
factors to make injury to the plaintiffs foreseeable.
The third test, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, is characteristic of either approach for it is a necessary element
in any negligence recovery that the plaintiff was harmed by another's
act or omission.
The fourth test, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, can also suggest either
approach. The court found that the defendant was closely related to
the injury because had it exercised reasonable care, it would have discovered that the prepackaged blueprints required correction. The
Association then should have withheld financing until the plans were
corrected. The emphasis is on the failure to exercise positive control.
This may be a MacPherson argument for it is -this negligent act which
simultaneously hurts both shareholders and homebuyers. 28 However,
if the surrender of control to an incompetent is itself admitted to be
the failure of positive control, then negligent entrustment can also
be implied from the court's discussion.
The fifth test, the moral blameworthiness of the defendant's act,
would at first suggest a negligent entrustment theory. The element of
moral wrong certainly attaches to lending an instrument to another in
wanton disregard of foreseeable serious harm to a third party. The
negligent omission of an act, however, seems less a matter of moral
culpability than of one which is punished as a matter of social
regulation. The court, however, said that substantial moral blame
attached to the defendant's actions because it failed both its shareholders and future homebuyers. It failed to protect the value of the
security of the loan and it failed to protect homebuyers when it knew
that the builder would probably act negligently. The court is thus
concerned with the actions as they directly affect the contract party,
a MacPhersonapproach, and is concerned as to independent injury to
foreseeable third parties, a negligent entrustment approach.
The sixth test, whether the imposition of liability will prevent
future harm, does not lend itself to any theory underlying such an
imposition. The court merely notes that rules which discourage misconduct are appropriate when applied to an established industry.
The force of deterrent liability, however, depends upon the scope of
2In the terminology of MacPherson these parties would be, respectively, the
contract party and the third party users.
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that liability, and this the court has left undefined by failing to
indicate upon what theory of liability it was proceeding.
Under the Connor decision a savings and loan association is now
faced with possible independent liability for negligent acts to third
parties by its debtor. When this liability with its attendant duty will
arise, however, has been left in question by the absence of a satisfactory
explanatory theory. If a MacPherson approach was used, the new
burden of liability apparently will not be great. The association will
only be liable to more parties for the breach of an existent duty to
shareholders. If, however, a negligent entrustment approach was
used, the new burden is apparently far reaching. The association will
be potentially liable not just on construction loans where the security
value is jeopardized, but potentially on every loan made. The approach
however is not discernible from the nature of the omissions or the
liability considerations stated in the opinion. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the court was not specific in alluding to the theoretical basis
upon which liability was imposed.
J. TERRANCE

ROACH

